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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Cases with many plaintiffs, few to none of whom will 
sue solely for themselves because the costs far outweigh the 
benefits, frequently result in class actions under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23.  Prerequisites are having (1) so many 
class members that joinder is impractical, (2) questions of law 
or fact that are common to the class, (3) one or more 
representatives whose claims or defenses are typical of those 
in the class, and (4) representatives who will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(a).  Besides these prerequisites, a class action must satisfy 
one of the subsections (1) through (3) in Rule 23(b).  As 
pertinent here, Rule 23(b)(2) provides that a class action may 
be maintained if the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met and 
“the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on 
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is 
appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”   
For the first time we review an order approving the 
settlement of a class action certified under Rule 23(b)(2) where 
the only benefit received by the class was the defendant’s 
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payment of a cy pres award to organizations the defendant 
approved.1 
The defendant, Google Inc., created a web browser 
“cookie” that tracks an internet user’s data (think following the 
trail of cookie crumbs).  For some Safari or Internet Explorer 
browser users, the cookie may have operated even if the user 
configured privacy settings to prevent it from tracking data.  
The class plaintiffs claim Google invaded users’ privacy under 
the California constitution and the state tort of intrusion upon 
seclusion (meaning the intrusion into a private place, 
conversation, or matter in a highly offensive manner).  In a 
disputed Rule 23(b)(2) class settlement, Google has agreed to 
stop using the cookies for Safari browsers and to pay $5.5 
million to cover class counsel’s fees and costs, incentive 
awards for the named class representatives, and cy pres 
distributions, without directly compensating any class 
members.  The six cy pres recipients are primarily data privacy 
organizations, and all must agree to use the funds to research 
and promote browser privacy.  In addition, Google would 
obtain, among other things, a class-wide release of all class-
                                              
1 “The term ‘cy pres’ is derived from the Norman French 
expression cy pres comme possible, which means ‘as near as 
possible.’”  In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 
168 n.1 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Democratic Cent. Comm. v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm’n, 84 F.3d 451, 455 
(D.C. Cir. 1996)).  The doctrine “originated in trusts-and-
estates law as a rule of construction used to preserve 
testamentary charitable gifts that otherwise would fail.”  Id. at 
168 n.2.  “When it becomes impossible to carry out the 
charitable gift as the testator intended, the doctrine allows the 
next best use of the funds to satisfy the testator’s intent as near 
as possible.”  Id. (quotation omitted). 
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member claims, including for money damages that did or could 
stem from the subject matter of the litigation.  
The lone objector, Theodore H. Frank, challenges the 
District Court’s certification of a settlement class and the terms 
of the approved settlement.  He argues that the cy pres money 
properly belongs to the class as compensation.  He asks us to 
vacate the settlement as unfair and require direct distributions 
to class members before resorting to cy pres awards.  In the 
alternative, if direct distributions are truly infeasible, he asserts 
the class should not have been certified due to inadequate 
representation.  Frank also challenges the parties’ choice of cy 
pres recipients because of their pre-existing relationships with 
Google and class counsel.  
We believe that, in some Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, a 
cy pres-only settlement may properly be approved.  But here 
the District Court’s cursory certification and fairness analysis 
were insufficient for us to review its order certifying the class 
and approving the settlement.  The settlement agreement’s 
broad release of claims for money damages and its designation 
of cy pres recipients are particularly concerning.  We thus 
vacate the order approving the settlement and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
I.  Background 
A. Prior Litigation 
We outlined the facts underlying the class’s claims in In 
re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy 
Litigation, 806 F.3d 125, 130–34 (3d Cir. 2015).  In brief, news 
broke in early 2012 that a Stanford graduate student had 
discovered Google’s Doubleclick.net cookies were bypassing 
Safari and Internet Explorer privacy settings and tracking 
internet-user information.  Google settled the resulting Federal 
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Trade Commission and state attorneys general lawsuits, 
agreeing to cease the practice and to pay a combined $39.5 
million in fines, though admitting no past acts or wrongdoing.  
Plaintiff internet users also filed claims against Google that 
were later consolidated into a putative class action.  The class 
complaint alleged violations of federal privacy and fraud 
statutes, California unfair competition and privacy statutes, the 
California constitution’s right to privacy, and that state’s 
privacy tort law.  It sought injunctive and monetary relief.  
Google moved to dismiss, and the District Court granted the 
motion in full.  On appeal we affirmed the dismissal of all but 
the California constitutional and tort claims.  See id. at 153.  
B.  Proposed Settlement 
On remand, the parties began discovery.  They then 
sought to avoid further litigation and began mediation before a 
former federal judge.  With the help of the mediator, the parties 
agreed to a settlement (the “Settlement Agreement”) and 
simultaneously moved for certification of a Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) class and approval of the settlement 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e).  The latter states 
that “claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class . . . may be 
settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the 
court’s approval.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).  It also lays out the 
procedures that apply to any such settlement, dismissal, or 
compromise.  Id.  
The proposed settlement defines the class as all persons 
in America who used Safari or Internet Explorer web browsers 
and “who visited a website from which Doubleclick.net . . .  
cookies were placed by the means alleged in the Complaint,” 
excluding individuals who had already obtained relief from 
Google or submitted “a valid and timely Request for 
Exclusion.”  Settlement Agreement §§ 2.3, 2.5 (defining 
“Class” and “Class Member”).  In sweeping language, the 
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settlement would release all class member claims, including for 
damages, that did or could stem from, or relate to, the subject 
matter of the litigation.  Settlement Agreement § 2.25 
(“Released Claims”). 
In exchange, Google would be required to assure it had 
“implemented systems configured to” abate or delete all third-
party Google cookies that exist in Safari browsers.  Settlement 
Agreement § 5.1 (“Assurance of Remediation”).  And as noted, 
it would also pay $5.5 million, to be divided among the 
settlement administrator, class counsel, the named class 
representatives, and cy pres recipients.  Settlement Agreement 
§ 5.2 (“Settlement Fund”). 
The Settlement Agreement requires both parties to 
agree to the cy pres recipients.  The class must propose up to 
ten options, and Google may strike any for a non-arbitrary 
reason and request a replacement.  Settlement Agreement § 5.3 
(“Cy Pres Recipients”).  The chosen recipients must agree “to 
devote the funds to promote public awareness and education, 
and/or to support research, development, and initiatives, 
related to the security and/or privacy of Internet browsers.”  Id.  
The parties ultimately agreed on six recipients: (1) the 
Berkeley Center for Law & Technology; (2) the Berkman 
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University; (3) the 
Center for Democracy & Technology (Privacy & Data 
Project); (4) Public Counsel; (5) the Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse; and (6) the Center for Internet & Society at 
Stanford University.  Neither Frank nor the District Court were 
privy to the selection process. 
C.  Class Action Settlements 
The settlement of a putative class action requires the 
approval of a district court, both for certifying the class and for 
determining whether the settlement is “fair, reasonable and 
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adequate.”  Halley v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 861 F.3d 481, 488 
(3d Cir. 2017).  We have provided guidance on the factors a 
court should consider in deciding whether to approve class 
action settlements, most notably the Girsh factors2 and the 
Prudential factors.3  Where, as here, the parties seek 
                                              
2 The Girsh factors, which a court must apply, are: “(1) the 
complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation; (2) 
the reaction of the class to the settlement; (3) the stage of the 
proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the 
risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing 
damages; (6) the risks of maintaining the class action through 
trial; (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater 
judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement 
fund in light of the best possible recovery; [and] (9) the range 
of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery 
in light of all the attendant risks of litigation.”  Girsh v. Jepson, 
521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir.1975) (quoting City of Detroit v. 
Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974)) (internal 
ellipses omitted). 
3 The Prudential factors, which a court may apply if relevant, 
are: (1) “the maturity of the underlying substantive issues . . . 
the development of scientific knowledge, the extent of 
discovery on the merits, and other factors that bear on the 
ability to assess the probable outcome of a trial on the merits 
of liability and individual damages”; (2) the “existence and 
probable outcome of claims by other classes and subclasses”; 
(3) “the comparison between the results achieved by the 
settlement for individual class or subclass members and the 
results achieved—or likely to be achieved—for other 
claimants”; (4) “whether class or subclass members are 
accorded the right to opt out of the settlement”; (5) “whether 
any provisions for attorneys’ fees are reasonable”; and (6) 
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simultaneous class certification and settlement approval, courts 
should be “even more scrupulous than usual when they 
examine the fairness of the proposed settlement.”  Prudential, 
148 F.3d at 317 (quotation omitted).  This heightened standard 
is designed to protect the interests of all class members.  Id. 
Some class action settlements also require the sending 
of notice to members of the putative class.  Before approving 
the settlement of a class action certified under Rule 23(b)(3), 
which is primarily used to pursue money-damages class 
actions,4 a court “must direct to class members the best notice 
that is practicable under the circumstances, including 
individual notice to all members who can be identified through 
reasonable effort.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).  For class 
actions certified under Rule 23(b)(1), which is often used to 
pursue class actions involving a common fund for injured 
stakeholders,5 or Rule 23(b)(2), which is used to pursue 
                                              
“whether the procedure for processing individual claims under 
the settlement is fair and reasonable.”  In re Prudential Ins. Co. 
Am. Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 323 (3d Cir. 1998). 
4 Rule 23(b)(3) provides that a class action may be maintained 
if the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met and “the court finds 
that the questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.”    
5 Rule 23(b)(1) provides that a class action may be maintained 
if the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met and prosecuting 
separate actions would create a risk of (1) “inconsistent or 
varying adjudications with respect to individual class members 
that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the 
party opposing the class,” or (2) “adjudications with respect to 
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injunctions in class actions, the Rules do not impose the same 
mandate of notice; rather, they state the court “may direct 
appropriate notice to the class.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A); 
see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 363 
(2011).  Of course, regardless what these rules say, the 
procedures for class action settlement—including the notice 
procedures—must also comply with due process requirements.  
See In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury 
Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 435 (3d Cir. 2016); see also Dukes, 564 
U.S. at 362. 
C. District Court Proceedings 
The District Court preliminarily certified the class for 
settlement under Rule 23(b)(2).  Following a notice period, the 
Court received fifty exclusion requests and one timely 
objection.  Frank, the sole objector, asserted that either the 
settlement was unfair because it improperly preferred cy pres 
over direct compensation to class members, or, in the 
alternative, the class could not be certified if direct 
compensation was impossible.  He further argued that the cy 
pres recipients raised a conflict-of-interest concern because 
class counsel was on one recipient’s board and Google was a 
regular donor to four others.  Finally, Frank challenged the 
attorneys’ fees—an issue he does not raise on appeal.  
To determine whether the settlement class could be 
certified, the District Court conducted a hearing as required by 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) and heard arguments from the parties 
and Frank.  Following the hearing, it issued a short opinion and 
                                              
individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be 
dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to 
the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or 
impede their ability to protect their interests.”   
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final order approving class certification and the settlement.  In 
its opinion the Court correctly noted it could certify a class only 
if the requirements of Rule 23(a) and one of the prongs of Rule 
23(b) were satisfied.  It stated that “no objections had been 
filed” challenging class certification, then in three sentences 
explained why all the requisite factors were met—without 
stating what type of Rule 23(b) class was certified.  
The Court then reviewed the proposed settlement for 
fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy, as required by Rule 
23(e)(2).  That Rule provides that if a class action settlement 
“would bind class members, the court may approve it only after 
a hearing and only on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and 
adequate.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).  The Court here noted that 
a presumption of fairness applies to class settlements that meet 
certain criteria established in our case law, but it did not make 
factual findings relating to those factors or hold whether the 
presumption applied in this case.  It then applied the Girsh 
factors in determining whether the settlement was fair, 
reasonable, and adequate.  Though it spent only four sentences 
analyzing the entirety of Girsh’s nine factors, the Court 
concluded that “the record adequately establishes” they had 
been satisfied.  It acknowledged additional factors to consider 
under Prudential, 148 F.3d at 323, and In re Baby Prods. 
Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2013), but did not 
expressly apply them.6 
                                              
6  Baby Products instructed courts to consider further “the 
degree of direct benefit provided to the class” from the 
settlement, potentially including “the number of individual 
awards compared to both the number of claims and the 
estimated number of class members, the size of the individual 
awards compared to claimants’ estimated damages, and the 
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Ultimately, the Court rejected Frank’s arguments and 
approved the settlement.  It found that “the nature of the likely 
compensation to the class members has always been 
complicated by the substantial problems of identifying the 
millions of potential class members[7] and then of translating 
their alleged loss of privacy into individual cash amounts.”  It 
further found that “payments to absent class members would 
be logistically burdensome, impractical, and economically 
infeasible, resulting (at best) with direct compensation of a de 
minim[i]s amount.”  Because the cy pres money would be used 
by “preeminent institutions for researching and advocating for 
online privacy” to promote Internet browser privacy, it held 
that the cy pres awards “bear a direct and substantial nexus to 
the interests of absent class members.”  In one sentence, the 
Court noted Frank’s objections to the pre-existing relationships 
between Google, class counsel, and the cy pres recipients, but 
held “no conflict of interest” had “undermine[d] the selected 
cy pres recipients.”  
Frank timely appealed. 
                                              
claims process used to determine individual awards.”  708 F.3d 
at 174. 
7 In its brief, Google asserts that because many people 
download Doubleclick.net cookies while browsing the internet 
and there is no meaningful way to distinguish cookies 
downloaded “by the means alleged in the Complaint” rather 
than by other, unobjectionable means, it would be 
exceptionally difficult, and perhaps impossible, for anyone to 
determine who is a class member.  Google Br. at 19.  At the 
fairness hearing, Judge Robinson also stated she “believe[d] 
this has always been a case in which the facts preclude direct 
individual compensation.”  
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II.  Discussion 
A. Article III Standing 
After oral argument, we held this appeal in abeyance 
pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of Frank v. Gaos, 
which also involved a cy pres-only class action settlement 
involving alleged privacy violations by Google.  139 S. Ct. 
1041, 1043–44 (2019).  But the Gaos Court did not review the 
class action settlement in that case.  Instead, in a per curiam 
opinion it vacated the settlement and remanded under its 
decision in Spokeo, Inc v. Robins, in which it clarified the 
“concreteness” requirement of the injury-in-fact prong of 
Article III standing, holding that a “bare procedural violation” 
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act was not sufficiently 
“concrete” to establish standing.  136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549–50 
(2016); Frank, 139 S. Ct. at 1046.  
After Gaos was issued, we requested supplemental 
briefing from the parties on whether plaintiffs adequately 
alleged a “concrete injury” for purposes of Article III standing.  
They here adequately did so, following our decision in In re 
Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation, 827 F.3d 262, 273–
74 (3d Cir. 2016).  There, in the wake of Spokeo, we considered 
whether a concrete injury occurred when a website operator 
stated it would not track the browser history and video-viewing 
of children who visited Nick.com but then did so anyway.  Id. 
at 269.  We held the website operator’s intrusion on the 
children’s personal browsing and viewing activities was 
sufficiently injurious for purposes of Article III standing.  Id. 
at 273–74.  The allegations of standing here are 
indistinguishable from those in Nickelodeon:  in both cases, the 
plaintiffs alleged that a third party (Viacom there, Google here) 
tracked their personal internet browsing information in 
violation of the third party’s own promises not to do so.  Id.  
The Nickelodeon decision, which considered and distinguished 
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the Supreme Court’s analysis in Spokeo, dictates that we 
recognize standing here.  
More than precedent supports our conclusion.  History 
and tradition reinforce that a concrete injury for Article III 
standing purposes occurs when Google, or any other third 
party, tracks a person’s internet browser activity without 
authorization.  Privacy torts have become “well-ensconced in 
the fabric of American law.”  In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. 
Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 638 (3d Cir. 2017).  
Indeed, as Justice Thomas has explained, private actions to 
remedy intrusions on the private sphere trace back to England, 
where a property owner needed only to show that another 
person placed a foot on his property to establish a traditional 
case or controversy.  See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1551 (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (citing Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 
291 (1765)).  Likewise, “Congress has long provided plaintiffs 
with the right to seek redress for unauthorized disclosures of 
information that, in Congress’s judgment, ought to remain 
private.”  Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 274.  In an era when 
millions of Americans conduct their affairs increasingly 
through electronic devices, the assertion Google makes—that 
federal courts are powerless to provide a remedy when an 
internet company surreptitiously collects private data—is 
untenable.  Nothing in Spokeo or any other Supreme Court 
decision suggests otherwise. 
B. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d), and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We review a district court’s decision to approve a 
settlement and to certify a class for abuse of discretion.  See 
Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 175.  “An appellate court may find an 
abuse of discretion where the district court’s decision rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion 
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of law or an improper application of law to fact.”  Id. (citing 
Prudential, 148 F.3d at 299).  However, a district court must 
“make its reasoning and application of the [law] clear, so that 
we, as a reviewing court, have a sufficient basis to review for 
abuse of discretion.”  Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 
F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2000); see also In re Cendant Corp. 
PRIDES Litig., 234 F.3d 166, 168 (3d Cir. 2000).  
C. Class Settlement Fairness 
Frank raises two challenges to the proposed settlement’s 
fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy under Rule 23(e)(2).  
First, he argues the settlement, whose main monetary 
component is a cy pres award, provides no marginal benefit to 
the class and therefore cannot satisfy that Rule.  Indeed, he 
asserts a cy pres award is always inappropriate if some 
individual class members could be compensated through a 
claims or lottery process.  Second, Frank challenges the 
selection of the cy pres recipients due to their pre-existing 
associations with either class counsel or Google. 
We have identified two opposing interests a district 
court must weigh when reviewing motions for settlement-only 
class certification and approval of the settlement.  First, we 
favor the parties reaching an amicable agreement and avoiding 
protracted litigation.  See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust 
Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 535 (3d Cir. 2004).  We do not wish to 
intrude overly on the parties’ hard-fought bargain.  See 
Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 593–95 (3d Cir. 
2010).  A district court thus is to presume a settlement is fair if 
“(1) the negotiations occurred at arms length; (2) there was 
sufficient discovery; (3) the proponents of the settlement are 
experienced in similar litigation; and (4) only a small fraction 
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of the class objected.”8  NFL Concussion Litig., 821 F.3d at 
436.  
At the same time, a district court has an obligation as a 
fiduciary for absent class members to examine the proposed 
settlement with care.  See, e.g., Warfarin Sodium, 391 F.3d at 
535.  This duty is heightened in settlement-only class cases: 
“[W]here settlement negotiations precede class certification, 
and approval for settlement and certification are sought 
simultaneously, we require district courts to be even ‘more 
scrupulous than usual’ when examining the fairness of the 
proposed settlement.”  Id.; see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619–20 (1997) (viewing as “altogether 
proper” the Third Circuit’s careful review of a settlement 
class’s certification to ensure absent class members were 
adequately represented).  In settlement negotiations, the 
interests of class representatives or class counsel do not always 
align with the interests of absent class members, and prior to 
certification class members may not know their claims are in 
litigation or that settlement negotiations are taking place.  See 
In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 788 (3d Cir. 1995).  Thus a district court’s 
“scrupulous” review of the settlement terms is “designed to 
ensure that class counsel has demonstrated ‘sustained 
advocacy’ throughout the course of the proceedings and has 
                                              
8 In its opinion the District Court recognized the fairness 
presumption’s existence in the case law, but did not tie any 
factual findings to the test’s factors or expressly hold whether 
the presumption applied.  Its preliminary order certifying the 
class similarly suggested, but did not expressly hold, that the 
presumption applies.  Frank does not challenge the application 
or misapplication of the fairness presumption, however.  Given 
the case’s facts and procedural posture, we assume the 
presumption applies. 
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protected the interests of all class members.”  Prudential, 148 
F.3d at 317 (quoting GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 805–06). 
These principles, combined with the legal analyses 
further described below, lead us to disagree with Frank that cy 
pres-only settlements are unfair per se under Rule 23(e)(2).  In 
some cases a cy pres-only settlement may be proper.  But we 
are troubled by the District Court’s cursory certification and 
fairness analysis in this case, and two features of the settlement, 
discussed below, compel us to vacate and remand.  
1. Cy Pres-Only Class Settlements 
We have never addressed whether a class action 
settlement’s monetary award may be given solely to cy pres 
recipients.  In the usual cy pres case, money from a class 
settlement fund remains after distributions to class members, 
perhaps because “class members cannot be located, decline to 
file claims, have died, or the parties have overestimated the 
amount projected for distribution.”  Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 
169.  In those cases, parties may seek to “distribute to a 
nonparty (or nonparties) the excess settlement funds for their 
next best use—a charitable purpose reasonably approximating 
the interests pursued by the class.”  Id.  Cy pres is generally 
preferable to escheating funds to the state or reverting them to 
the defendant because it “preserve[s] the [class action’s] 
deterrent effect . . . [and] (at least theoretically) more closely 
tailor[s] the distribution to the interests of class members.”  Id. 
at 172. 
Still, many federal courts, the media, academia, and 
even the Chief Justice of the United States view cy pres awards 
with skepticism.9  Among other things, they “present a 
                                              
9 Chief Justice Roberts has voiced concerns regarding cy pres, 
particularly where it constitutes a class’s only monetary relief.  
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potential conflict of interest between class counsel and their 
clients” because they “may increase a settlement fund, and 
with it attorneys’ fees, without increasing the direct benefit to 
the class.”  Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 173.  A settlement whose 
only monetary distributions are to class counsel, class 
representatives, and cy pres recipients, as in this case, presents 
the risk of a still greater misalignment of interests: the 
settlement clearly benefits the defendant (who obtains peace at 
a potentially reduced cost), class counsel (who are guaranteed 
payment in the settlement), and the named representatives 
(who are given an incentive award in the settlement), while any 
benefit to other class members is indirect and inconsequential 
monetarily. 
Despite cy pres’ flaws, we held in Baby Products that 
“a district court does not abuse its discretion by approving a 
class action settlement agreement that includes a cy pres 
component directing distribution of excess settlement funds to 
a third party to be used for a purpose related to the class injury.”  
Id. at 172.  Favorably citing the American Law Institute’s 
(“ALI”) guidelines, we held that cy pres was appropriate where 
some class members were compensated directly and “further 
individual distributions are economically infeasible.”  Id. at 
173 (citing ALI, Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation 
§ 3.07(b) (2010)).  We left the door open for other permissible 
forms of cy pres, id., and nowhere addressed it in the context 
of a Rule 23(b)(2) class. 
With this background, we now consider whether a cy 
pres-only settlement in a Rule 23(b)(2) class can ever satisfy 
the fairness requirements of Rule 23(e)(2), and, if so, whether 
                                              
See Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
statement respecting denial of certiorari). 
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the District Court abused its discretion in approving this 
particular settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate. 
Frank’s central argument on appeal is that cy pres 
awards should never be preferred over direct distributions to 
class members because the settlement fund properly “belongs” 
to individual class members as monetary compensation for 
their injuries.  He proposes that the $5.5 million settlement 
fund is “sufficient to fund either a claims process or a lottery 
distribution for the class,” even though he acknowledges it 
would be “impossible to pay every class member.”  Obj. Br. 
at 9.  He criticizes the District Court’s weighing of the 
settlement fund against the size of the entire class because 
“[e]ven in billion-dollar securities settlements where class 
members have suffered substantial losses, the parties do not 
know who each and every class member is and must rely upon 
class members to identify themselves and the size of their loss 
in a claims process.”  Id. at 27–28. 
We know no ruling that requires district courts to 
approve only settlements that provide for direct class 
distributions on these facts.  Indeed, Baby Products suggested 
the opposite.  We reasoned that “cy pres distributions are most 
appropriate where further individual distributions are 
economically infeasible” and declined to prohibit cy pres 
distributions in other situations, including where even an initial 
distribution to some class members would be infeasible.  708 
F.3d at 173.  We also reaffirmed that settlement approval 
should be a practical inquiry rooted in the particular case’s 
facts and procedural posture—as the Girsh and Prudential 
factors reflect.  Id. at 173–74.  Ultimately “[t]he role of a 
district court is not to determine whether the settlement is the 
fairest possible resolution . . . [, but rather to] determine 
whether the compromises reflected in the settlement . . . are 
fair, reasonable, and adequate when considered from the 
perspective of the class as a whole.”  Id. 
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Google further argues that this settlement fund was 
never intended to compensate class members monetarily.  
Rather, it claims the fund enhances the settlement’s deterrent 
effect by funding data privacy institutions that will work to 
prevent similar potential privacy invasions from occurring in 
the future.  The class representatives similarly point out that a 
claims-made process or lottery geared toward individual 
distributions would “not come close to addressing the Internet 
privacy concerns of all class members in this case.”  Class Br. 
at 23. 
This rationale accords with the purpose of the Rule 
23(b)(2) class structure.  The Supreme Court has described this 
as a more “traditional” collective action because it assumes a 
single, “indivisible” injunctive or declaratory remedy against 
the defendant will provide relief to all class members equally.  
Dukes, 564 U.S. at 361–63.  A (b)(2) class therefore does not 
involve individualized determinations of liability or damages, 
id.,10 or even require that individual class members be 
ascertainable, Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 563 (3d Cir. 
2015).  Nor does certification require the “greater procedural 
protections” of (b)(3) classes, such as the opportunity for 
individual class members to receive notice of the action or the 
opportunity to opt out.  See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 362.  To certify 
a (b)(2) class, a court must simply find that “the party opposing 
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply 
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the 
class as a whole.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).  In other words, the 
class must be “cohesive” such that the members “have strong 
                                              
10  In fact, a non-settlement (b)(2) class cannot be certified if it 
brings claims for monetary relief that are more than 
“incidental.”  Dukes, 564 U.S. at 360. 
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commonality of interests.”  Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 
F.3d 255, 263–64 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Contrary to Frank’s arguments, then, we see no reason 
why a cy pres-only (b)(2) settlement that satisfies Rule 23’s 
certification and fairness requirements could not “belong” to 
the class as a whole, and not to individual class members as 
monetary compensation.  Direct monetary distributions 
typically would not accomplish the purpose of a (b)(2) class.  
It is not an inherent abuse of discretion for a district court to 
allow a cy pres-only settlement rather than random 
compensation, and possibly even overcompensation through a 
lottery, of some (b)(2) class members to the exclusion of 
others. 
2. Review of the District Court’s Settlement 
Approval  
This brings us to the Settlement Agreement.  District 
courts are to assess the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy 
of a cy pres award under Rule 23(e)(2) using “the same 
framework developed for assessing other aspects of class 
action settlements”: namely, applying the Girsh factors; 
applying the Prudential factors where applicable; and also 
considering “the degree of direct benefit provided to the class,” 
which may include “the number of individual awards 
compared to both the number of claims and the estimated 
number of class members, the size of the individual awards 
compared to claimants’ estimated damages, and the claims 
process used to determine individual awards.”  Baby Prods., 
708 F.3d at 174.  “[C]y pres awards should generally represent 
a small percentage of total settlement funds” unless a district 
court finds “sufficient justification.”  Id. 
In its opinion approving the Settlement Agreement, the 
District Court ran through the Girsh factors and held that all 
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nine were satisfied, but in a more perfunctory fashion than we 
are accustomed to reviewing on appeal.  It also acknowledged 
the additional factors we suggested district courts consider in 
Prudential, 148 F.3d at 323, and Baby Products, 708 F.3d at 
174, but did not explicitly apply them.  
In this context, we are not persuaded the Court 
sufficiently assessed the fairness, reasonableness, and 
adequacy of the settlement.  In particular, two features of the 
settlement present concerns that were not adequately 
considered by it:  the broad class-wide release of claims for 
money damages, and selection of the specific cy pres 
recipients.  
a. Class-wide Release  
The Settlement Agreement purports to release all class 
member claims, including for damages, that did or could stem 
from, or relate to, the subject matter of the litigation.  This 
raises a red flag.  Before the District Court, class counsel 
acknowledged that the dismissal of all claims providing for 
statutory damages made class certification more difficult.  See 
District Court Docket, ECF No. 163 (Motion for Preliminary 
Approval of Class Action Settlement) at 15.  That premise, in 
turn, shaped the structure of both class certification and class 
notice:  the parties sought to certify an injunction class under 
Rule 23(b)(2), not a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3), see 
District Court Docket, ECF No. 163, and thus avoided the 
heightened certification and notice requirements that apply to 
the latter.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring 
predominance and superiority); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) 
(requiring “the best notice that is practicable under the 
circumstances” for 23(b)(3) settlements).   
Yet having sidestepped these requirements, Google and 
class counsel nonetheless obtained—for themselves anyway—
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the precise benefits that a Rule 23(b)(3) class gives to the 
defendant and class counsel:  namely, a broad class-wide 
release of claims for money damages for the defendant, and a 
percentage-of-fund calculation of attorneys’ fees for class 
counsel.  The District Court’s failure to scrutinize this 
troubling aspect of the Settlement Agreement prevents us from 
reviewing its fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy.  See 
Gunter, 223 F.3d at 196 (district court’s reasoning and 
application of the law must be clear enough to provide basis 
for review).  We also question, and leave to the District Court 
on remand, whether a defendant can ever obtain a class-wide 
release of claims for money damages in a Rule 23(b)(2) 
settlement, and if so, whether a release of that kind requires a 
heightened form of notice either under Rule 23(c)(2)(B) or due 
process tenets.  Cf. NFL Concussion Litig., 821 F.3d at 435 
(noting that class action notice must comply with due process); 
see also In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merchant 
Discount Antitrust Litig., 827 F.3d 223, 236 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(reversing district court’s approval of Rule 23(b)(2) settlement 
with broad release); Koby v. ARS Nat’l Servs., 846 F.3d 1071, 
1079 (9th Cir. 2017) (same).  
b. Cy Pres Recipients  
The District Court held that “the proposed cy pres 
distributions are appropriately tailored and focused.”  It found 
the selected cy pres recipients to be “among the preeminent 
institutions for researching and advocating for online privacy,” 
and that they would properly be required to use the funds for 
internet browser privacy initiatives.  Id.  Because “this case is 
about Google’s alleged circumvention of Internet browser 
privacy settings,” it concluded, the proposed cy pres 
distributions thus “bear a direct and substantial nexus to the 
interests of absent class members.”  The Court made no finding 
that the class’s nationwide nature was reflected in the 
geographical scope of cy pres recipients’ work.  See, e.g., 
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Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 362 F. Supp. 
2d 574, 576 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“In [reviewing cy pres awards], 
the court should consider . . . the geographic scope of the 
case.”).  However, the record shows they overlap; the 
promotion of better online privacy inherently has nationwide 
effects. 
In sum, on the District Court’s review of the record, the 
proposed cy pres awards would be used for a purpose directly 
and substantially related to the class’s interests.  The record 
also reflects that the geographic scope of the class corresponds 
to that of the cy pres recipients.  The Court held the proposed 
cy pres awards were fair, reasonable, and adequate when 
viewed “from the perspective of the Settlement Class as a 
whole.”  Although other aspects of its analysis were unusually 
brief, the Court did not abuse its discretion by approving this 
(b)(2) class settlement’s cy pres structure. 
Yet we are troubled here by the selection of the specific 
cy pres recipients.  Frank challenges the selection of those 
recipients as unfair under Rule 23(e)(2) due to pre-existing 
associations between them and class counsel or Google.  He 
asserts that Google has long ties to Stanford and is a regular 
donor and cy pres payor to the Berkeley Center for Law & 
Technology, the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at 
Harvard University, the Center for Internet & Society at 
Stanford University, and the Center for Democracy & 
Technology.  One of the lawyers representing the class is also 
a board member of Public Counsel. 
We have not previously addressed when a prior 
relationship between a cy pres recipient and one of the litigants 
in a class action undermines the proposed settlement’s fairness.  
Regardless of the relevant standard, however, the District 
Court’s treatment of the question warrants remand.  It 
conducted no fact finding, either through additional filings or 
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an evidentiary hearing, to determine the nature of the 
relationships between the cy pres recipients and Google or 
class counsel.  In its opinion, the Court misstated the nature of 
Frank’s objections, stating he “takes the position that any 
relationship between a party (and its counsel) and a proposed 
cy pres recipient automatically disqualifies the proposed cy 
pres recipient.”  It then dismissed the issue in a single sentence 
with no analysis, holding that “no conflict of interest” had 
“undermine[d] the selected cy pres recipients.”  This is not the 
“scrupulous” examination required of a court acting as a 
fiduciary for absent class members.  See Warfarin Sodium, 391 
F.3d at 534; see also Gunter, 223 F.3d at 196. 
We further hold that, if challenged by an objector, a 
district court must review the selected cy pres recipients to 
determine whether they have a significant prior affiliation with 
any party, counsel, or the court.  A settlement should not be 
approved if such a prior affiliation “would raise substantial 
questions . . . whether the selection of the recipient was made 
on the merits.”  ALI, Principles of the Law of Aggregate 
Litigation § 3.07 cmt. b.  The parties seeking settlement 
approval bear the burden of explaining to a court why the cy 
pres selection was fair, which may include describing the 
nature of any prior affiliations; what role, if any, each 
affiliation played in the cy pres selection process; whether 
other recipients were sincerely considered; and why these 
recipients are the proper choice.  As always, “[w]here a court 
fears counsel is conflicted, it should subject the settlement to 
increased scrutiny.”  Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 173. 
On remand, the District Court should consider whether 
these cy pres recipients have significant prior affiliations with 
Google, class counsel, or the Court, and, if so, whether the 
selection process failed to satisfy Rule 23(e)(2) by raising 
substantial questions whether the recipients were chosen on the 
merits.  Where, as here, the only benefit to class members is a 
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cy pres award, parties may also want to involve class members 
or a neutral participant in the selection of recipients to ward off 
any appearance of impropriety.   
D. Class Certification 
Frank asserts that, even if his settlement fairness 
challenge fails, reversal is still appropriate on class-
certification grounds.  If a settlement will not confer a 
meaningful benefit to absent class members, he argues it must 
fail to satisfy Rule 23(a)(4) and (g)(4).  Those Rules provide 
that a class’s representative plaintiffs and counsel, 
respectively, must “fairly and adequately” represent the 
interests of the class.  Frank contends that a cy pres-only 
settlement in these circumstances confers no benefit on the 
class, which inherently shows that the class representative and 
counsel failed to represent the class fairly and adequately.  For 
this reason, he claims a cy pres-only settlement class cannot be 
certified due to inadequate representation. 
Frank’s class certification challenge is not really an 
alternative ground for reversal.  It is predicated on his 
challenge to the settlement.  In light of our decision to remand, 
we leave to the District Court whether to reconsider Frank’s 
contentions concerning the propriety of class certification in 
light of its further consideration and potential factfinding.  
* * * * * 
The vista view of this case is not pretty.  According to 
the complaint, an internet behemoth with unprecedented tools 
for monitoring private conduct told millions of Americans it 
would not track their personal browser history, and then it did 
so anyway to profit from the data.  Through the proposed class-
action settlement, the purported wrongdoer promises to pay a 
couple million dollars to class counsel and make a cy pres 
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contribution to organizations it was already donating to 
otherwise (at least one of which has an affiliation with class 
counsel).  By seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(2), the 
defendant and class counsel avoid the additional safeguards 
that apply to Rule 23(b)(3) actions.  One might think this would 
leave room for class members to pursue damages individually; 
yet that relief is foreclosed as well, as the settlement contains a 
nationwide release of claims for money damages that arose or 
could arise were there unauthorized snooping, presumably 
covering tens if not hundreds of millions of Americans.  In this 
context, we believe the District Court’s factfinding and legal 
analysis were insufficient for us to review its order certifying 
the class and approving the fairness, reasonableness, and 
adequacy of the settlement.  We thus vacate and remand for 
further proceedings in accord with this opinion. 
